- oiste.org
- Root of Trust
Root of TrustHeld in Switzerland since 1998
A neutral root of trust, re‑anchored for the quantum age
Since 1998 OISTE has held, in Switzerland, a cryptographic root of trust that governments, companies and citizens can verify. In May 2025 it generated a second root, built on post-quantum cryptography, so that the identities it anchors survive the arrival of quantum computers.
Why a second root
Everything signed today rests on mathematics a quantum computer is expected to break
RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography protect almost every certificate, passport chip, banking session and software update in use. Both fall to the same quantum algorithm, so moving from one to the other buys nothing.
The risk is already present. Encrypted traffic captured today can be stored and decrypted later, once a capable machine exists. NIST’s draft transition plan proposes deprecating 112-bit RSA and ECC after 2030 and disallowing quantum-vulnerable algorithms after 2035.
A root of trust cannot be patched in an emergency. It has to be generated, audited, carried by operating systems and browsers, and adopted by every authority beneath it. That takes years, which is why OISTE generated its post-quantum root in 2025.
Quantum Root Key
Generated in Geneva, 7 May 2025
A new root of trust built entirely on NIST-standardised post-quantum algorithms. It sits beside the classical roots, so authorities can migrate one by one with no day on which certificates stop validating.
| Element | Specification |
|---|---|
| Signature | ML-DSA (FIPS 204, formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) |
| Key establishment | ML-KEM (FIPS 203, formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber) |
| Alternate signature | FALCON |
| Key custody | Hardware security modules, trusted platform modules and secure microcontrollers |
| Lifecycle | Issuance, renewal and revocation of quantum-resistant certificates, with CRL and OCSP endpoints |
| Distribution | Pending post-quantum root support in operating systems and browsers |
Trust model
The foundation owns the roots; the operator runs them
OISTE is the sole owner of a set of root certification authorities. Holding them in a foundation keeps the trust model independent, and shields relying parties from any change in the ownership of the company that operates it.
As owner, OISTE delegates to WISeKey SA the role of Operator of the Trust Model. WISeKey operates the public key infrastructure and provides commercial trust services, always under the foundation’s supervision. The foundation keeps final responsibility for three things:
- approving and controlling the subordinate certification authorities that operate under the OISTE roots;
- defining the certificate policies for each type of identity issued: persons, applications and objects;
- defining the certification practice statement that sets how those authorities operate.
Third parties may operate under the roots as subordinate authorities once they meet every internal and external requirement and prove it through an independent audit. OISTE and WISeKey are audited periodically on the same basis.
Six roles
How authority is divided
Under Swiss law a foundation has no shareholders. It has capital and a purpose it must pursue, and the Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (FSAF) supervises how it pursues that purpose (Art. 84 Swiss Civil Code).
Foundation
OISTE, a Swiss foundation under Art. 80 ff. of the Civil Code. Owns the roots and the intellectual property of the trust model.
Operator
WISeKey SA, a separate legal entity contractually bound to pursue the foundation’s objectives. Runs the infrastructure and the commercial services.
Auditor
An independent auditor designated directly or indirectly by the foundation. Audits both the foundation and the operator.
Supervisory authority
Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (FSAF), which supervises the foundation in its governance, accountability and annual report.
Policy Approval Authority
A committee within the foundation that drafts, adopts and maintains the policies of the trust model. How the PAA works.
Users
Communities of trust, public or private, that join as clients of the operator: biometric passports, electronic ID systems, device identity, employee cards and similar schemes.
Certificates
What affiliates can issue under the OISTE roots
Affiliates operate issuing CAs under the Standard and Advanced policy certification authorities. Full profiles are in the repository.
Standard
Email and basic signing
Email protection and non-legally binding signatures. The certificate references an email address, not a verified person.
Advanced
Legally binding identity
Higher assurance for legally binding signatures, issued to individuals, legal persons and applications such as TLS servers.
Device
Connected objects
Certificates adapted to the Internet of Things, provisioned into secure chips at manufacture.
Governance
Who decides what the root will sign
The foundation owns the roots and sets the policy. The operator runs the machines under contract. An independent auditor checks both. Every document is public.
Policy Approval Authority
Drafts, approves and revises the CP/CPS the operator must follow.
DocumentsRepository
The current CP/CPS, published on GitHub with full version history.
CertificatesRoots and certificates
Fingerprints, validity and revocation lists for every OISTE root.
AssuranceAccreditations
WebTrust seals for certification authorities, TLS, EV, S/MIME and network security.
